Probe of BP plant blast cites oversight

Probe of BP plant blast cites oversight

	Published : Wed, 21 Mar 2007 09:21 By : Agencies Print this Story

TEXAS CITY, Texas (AP) - Overly lax federal oversight and cost-cutting by BP were factors in a 2005 explosion at the oil giant's Texas City refinery that killed 15 people and injured 170, the worst U.S. industrial accident since 1990, a government report found.

Though companies have plenty of safeguards for individual workers' safety, there is a potentially deadly lack of sound procedures to measure process safety, according to the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, which released the report Tuesday.

At a public meeting Tuesday night where the board approved the report, Chairwoman Carolyn W. Merritt vowed that the agency would follow up on the report's safety recommendations until they are adopted.

'The 15 men and women who died here two years ago must not be allowed to perish in vain,' Merritt said at the meeting.

The CSB said that although the Texas City plant had several fatal accidents over the last 30 years, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration had done only one process safety management inspection at the refinery -- in 1998. Such inspections are designed to prevent disasters such as explosions.

Nationally, the board found that between 1995 and 2005, OSHA had done few of the inspections.

Merritt urged companies to read the report on the March 23, 2005, explosion and to dedicate the same attention to protecting workers and the public that they 'now dedicate to managing their financial controls.'

'Do not be lulled into complacency,' Merritt said. 'Do not allow any other families to suffer as so many here in Texas City have.'

Several citizens who spoke at the meeting expressed cynicism about the petrochemical industry and said companies value profits over people.

'It comes down to corporate greed,' said Lee Medley of the Galveston County Central Labor Council. 'This could have happened in any one of these refineries or chemical plants from Brownsville all the way to Pensacola, Fla.'

Representatives from industry groups like the Center for Chemical Process Safety and the United Steelworkers said they would adopt the recommendations as guidelines for their members and work toward developing new industry standards.

'We have taken the lessons learned,' said Scott Berger of the chemical safety group.

The report said OSHA made other, unplanned inspections after accidents, complaints or referrals -- without saying how many -- but that those visits were typically narrower and shorter than planned inspections.

BP said Tuesday it has accepted responsibility for the accident, worked diligently to provide fair compensation to those injured and to families of those who died, and cooperated fully with the CSB.

'Notwithstanding the company's strong disagreement with some of the content of the CSB report, particularly many of the findings and conclusions, BP will give full and careful consideration to CSB's recommendations, in conjunction with the many activities already under way to improve process safety management,' the statement said.

The CSB recommends OSHA increase the number of comprehensive safety inspections and the number of people to do them.

'OSHA's national focus on inspecting facilities with high injury rates, while important, has resulted in reduced attention to preventing less frequent, but catastrophic, process safety incidents such as the one at Texas City,' the report said.

Don Holmstrom, the CSB's lead investigator of the Texas City blast, said evidence showed OSHA did not have enough qualified inspectors to enforce the process safety management standard at oil and chemical facilities.

OSHA did only nine such inspections in targeted industries over the 10-year period -- and none in the refining sector, Holstrom said.

Holmstrom said OSHA and the board worked well together in the immediate days after the accident. But after the CSB learned of other major accidents and fatalities at the Texas City site and began to request material on specific incidents, OSHA didn't always comply, he said.

In a brief statement released Tuesday evening, Edwin G. Foulke, assistant U.S labor secretary for OSHA, said the CSB report confirms OSHA's own investigative findings that BP failed to make safety and health a priority at Texas City.

Foulke didn't specifically cite the CSB's criticism of OSHA, but noted: 'OSHA levied the largest fine in the agency's history against BP and this year will conduct more than 100 refinery inspections. OSHA is also implementing a national emphasis program to ensure that every refinery under its jurisdiction is inspected and all employees are protected.'

Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., said his Energy and Commerce Committee plans hearings into BP's safety programs in light of the findings about the Texas City blast and the Prudhoe Bay oil spills last year.

'The millions of dollars in fines that were levied against BP after the explosion have done little more than close the door after the horse had left the stable. It's clear that both additional oversight measures and sweeping cultural changes are critical,' said Dingell in a statement.

Holmstrom said CSB officials met with those from OSHA recently to discuss the report's findings, and he noted 'the meeting went well.'

'They indicated they are certainly training a number of people in process safety management and indicated a willingness to work with the CSB in resolving the issues contained in our recommendations,' he said.

The CSB does not issue citations or fines but makes safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

In trading Tuesday on the New York Stock Exchange, BP PLC shares rose 18 cents to close at $60.28. They have traded in a 52-week range of $58.62 to $76.85.

The Texas City explosion occurred when part of the plant's isomerization unit, which boosts the level of octane in gasoline, overfilled with highly flammable liquid hydrocarbons. A geyser of flammable liquid and vapor ignited as the unit started up. Alarms and gauges that should have warned of the overfilling equipment failed to work at the plant, about 40 miles southeast of Houston.

The unit had a history of problems and was not hooked up to a flare system that burns off vapor and could have prevented or minimized the accident, the CSB has said.

Merritt noted the investigation was the CSB's largest and most complex since its formation nine years ago. A team of investigators interviewed 370 witnesses, reviewed more than 30,000 documents and tested equipment, instruments and chemicals.

The new report recommends BP appoint a board member with expertise in process safety and for BP senior executives to establish an improved incident-reporting program and use new indicators to measure safety performance.

It also calls on OSHA to 'identify those facilities at the greatest risk of a catastrophic accident' and conduct comprehensive inspections.

The report notes that proposed OSHA fines during the 20 years preceding the March 2005 explosion -- a period in which 10 people were killed at the refinery -- totaled $270,255. Net fines collected after negotiations came to $77,860.

Six months after the blast, in September 2005, OSHA found BP committed more than 300 willful violations of its rules and fined the company $21.3 million.

In January, after an independent review by a panel led by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III, BP said it planned to increase spending on improvements at U.S. refineries from $1.2 billion in 2005 to an average of $1.7 billion a year from 2007 to 2010. BP's net profit for 2005 amounted to $22 billion.

The January report found poor safety oversight, deficient leadership and short-term focus at BP's five U.S. refineries. That investigation was commissioned by BP at the CSB's suggestion.

AP Business Writers John Porretto in Houston and Dan Caterinicchia in Washington, D.C., contributed to this report.