European investors are well aware of the energy sector’s sensitivity to reputational risks: here, any “overlap of roles” instantly becomes not just a matter of compliance but of politics. That is why the partnership between Czech-Ukrainian entrepreneur Tomas Fiala (Dragon Capital) and the former CEO of the national electricity transmission system operator Ukrenergo, Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, in the distributed generation project Power One, is a story not only about money but also about the optics of good governance. Against the backdrop of recent investigative actions by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) regarding the former head of Ukrenergo and earlier proceedings, the media narrative increasingly resembles a “revolving door”: from a system operator to a commercial partner of an investment firm whose assets are technically and commercially connected to the same operator’s grid.
Timeline: From Resignation to Joint Business
On September 2, 2024, the supervisory board of Ukrenergo decided to dismiss Volodymyr Kudrytskyi. In October 2025, the State Bureau of Investigation conducted searches as part of an inquiry into possible abuse of office and misappropriation of state company funds during the construction of high-voltage lines. Kudrytskyi publicly stated that no formal charges were brought against him and described the actions of law enforcement as a “political signal.”
Meanwhile, business developments moved fast. Between April and July 2025, Dragon Capital and the energy company Nedzhen (co-founded by Kudrytskyi and Andrii Nemirovskyi) presented Power One, a portfolio of distributed flexible generation (gas piston units and storage systems). On July 10, at URC-2025 in Rome, the EBRD signed a Mandate Letter with Dragon and Nedzhen for project financing of €21.1 million. According to the model, Power One is initially fully owned by Dragon Capital, while Nedzhen acts as the operational partner.
The Market Formed During Kudrytskyi’s Tenure
The key segment for such portfolios consists of long-term contracts for ancillary services and reserves procured by the system operator. It was Ukrenergo that launched multi-year auctions designed to stimulate the construction of new maneuverable capacities after Russia’s massive strikes on the power generation system. This is precisely the niche Power One targets. Hence the European sensitivity: when a former TSO chief quickly joins a project profiting in a segment that was institutionally shaped under his leadership, it creates the “optics of overlapping roles” — even if no formal violations are present.
Additional Anchors of Reputational Risk
First, the “body armor case”: back in August 2024, Kudrytskyi admitted that NABU questioned him as a witness in an investigation concerning Ukrenergo’s procurement of protective gear in spring 2022; at the same time, the head of the company’s security department — who supervised the procurement — was detained. Legally, it is a different episode, but in the media it reinforces the “background” around the former executive.
Second, the United Energy case: in 2024, NABU and SAPO announced suspicions and declared suspects wanted in a scheme involving the misappropriation of Ukrenergo’s electricity, with reported losses of 716 million UAH; among those wanted is Ukrenergo’s department director Dmytro Kondrashov, a direct subordinate of the company’s top management. Official bureau statements and extensive media coverage have shaped another line of criticism against the “old team.”
Third, the sanctions turbulence surrounding Arricano: on June 22, 2025, Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council imposed sanctions on Arricano Real Estate plc and its Estonian shareholders. Several media outlets initially mentioned Dragon Capital’s former involvement in Arricano’s capital (up to 2024). Dragon Capital officially stated that it exited Arricano’s shareholding back in July 2024 — yet a “media tail” of the sanctions story still affected Fiala’s brand.
The Amber Dragon Umbrella and the Private JV: A Case of “Excessive Concentration”?
Alongside the private Power One JV, Dragon Capital and the British firm Amber Infrastructure are launching the Amber Dragon Ukraine Infrastructure Fund I (targeting €350 million; among LPs are international financial institutions), focused on energy and critical infrastructure. The fund aims to scale private capital for reconstruction. The simultaneous presence of Dragon in both the fund and a private JV with a former TSO head creates an “overlap of fields,” requiring enhanced transparency in related-party policies.
Positions of the Parties and the Balance of Risks
The official framework of Power One emphasizes “system resilience, flexibility, and rapid impact on energy security,” explaining EBRD’s interest in debt financing. Kudrytskyi publicly insists that no charges have been filed against him and views the searches as pressure; Dragon Capital describes itself as a financial partner, while operational management rests with Nedzhen. All this aligns with the European logic of infrastructure as a service — but it does not remove the main challenge: managing reputational risk in sectors where monetization partly depends on the system operator’s tariff.
What’s Next
It appears that Tomas Fiala is about to face a reputational test. The market has barely absorbed the sanctions scandal around Arricano, when a new focus has shifted to his partnership with a former state executive still surrounded by ongoing investigations. This is not a conviction or a direct charge against Kudrytskyi, but for an investor of Dragon’s scale, it is a test of transparency standards, of the “Chinese walls” between funds and private JVs, and of readiness to proactively disclose details on auctions, contracts, and revenue sources.
The investment idea itself seems rational — but the optics are, at the very least, complicated. Distributed generation is essential for Ukraine here and now; the EBRD confirms this through its mandate. Yet the configuration “Dragon ↔ Amber Dragon Fund ↔ private JV with former TSO head” demands a European level of disclosure: policies on related parties, supplier/project selection procedures, network connection schedules, and tariff impact assessments.
It is precisely these disclosures — not the headlines — that will determine whether Fiala’s bet becomes a case study in “reconstruction without corruption” or remains mired in reputational ambiguity.

